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INTRODUCTION 
Investment in intellectual property is considered a shrewd business 
strategy.1 However, companies that invest heavily in patenting the results of 
research and development may later be surprised by their inability to generate 
revenue from their patent portfolios. This is because those seeking to enforce 
patents in the predictable arts may find themselves stymied by recent 
developments in patent jurisprudence, especially with respect to the doctrine of 
obviousness. By encouraging a common sense perspective and rejecting rigid 
formulations, the Supreme Court in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.2 
unintentionally injected a significant measure of subjectivity and irregularity 
into the obviousness analysis, which has led to an increase in the likelihood of a 
predictable arts patent being found obvious due to the wide array of rationales 
available to make such a conclusion. Another emerging trend in the post-KSR 
landscape is that the Supreme Court’s flexible approach in determining 
obviousness has created a bias against patents in the predictable arts. 
Part I of this paper defines the general contours between patents in the 
predictable arts and patents in the unpredictable arts. Parts II and III discuss how 
the holding of KSR and subsequent USPTO3 guidelines establish a bias against 
predictable art patents. In Part IV, this Article will examine two ways in which 
the bias against predictable arts patents manifests itself in patent invalidity 
  
 * Copyright © 2014 David Tseng. Senior Attorney, Dorsey & Whitney LLP. A 
special thanks to the editors of the Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property for their 
feedback and suggestions. The author would also like to thank Professors Toshiko 
Takenaka and Signe Naeve of the University of Washington School of Law for their 
input. 
 1 Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts: Let’s Build a PIT to Catch Patent 
Trolls, 6 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 367, 368 (2005) (“[I]ntellectual property portfolios (of which 
patents are a major part) have become valuable assets for businesses and important tools 
in attracting investment and venture capital. Modern patents have an intrinsic value 
beyond merely the right to exclude competitors—they serve as powerful marketing tools 
and can have the same influence on a corporation's bottom line as tangible property 
assets. In fact, today's intellectual property is a key corporate asset precisely because it 
may be the primary driver of revenue.”). 
 2 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 3 “USPTO” refers to the United States Patent and Trademark Office. 
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jurisprudence: (1) the difficulty of proving secondary objective indicia of 
nonobviousness; and (2) the availability of a rigid test such as the Federal 
Circuit’s “lead compound” analysis to inventions in the unpredictable arts but 
not the predictable arts. Further, Part IV will discuss the ways in which recent 
Federal Circuit decisions further confirm the bias resulting from the KSR 
decision. Finally, Part V proposes a revitalization of secondary considerations 
and the prohibition against the use of hindsight bias to offset this bias. 
I. DEFINITION OF PREDICTABLE ARTS 
In patent law jurisprudence, courts have traditionally differentiated 
between predictable and unpredictable arts.4 The distinction between predictable 
and unpredictable arises out of an enablement analysis, a statutory requirement 
to patentability.5 Under the enablement analysis, a patent disclosure needs to 
sufficiently enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make or use the invention 
without undue experimentation.6 The predictability of art is one of the factors 
that is used to assess the level of experimentation.7 
A predictable art can be characterized as a technology field where one of 
ordinary skill has access to an extensive base of general knowledge. By contrast, 
a technological field is less predictable when a technology is nascent; therefore, 
the patent disclosure must include “specific and useful teaching,” because 
enabling information is beyond the knowledge of an ordinary artisan.8 In other 
words, a predictable art is a field of art where, even when the patent disclosure is 
missing explanation of claimed technical details, one of ordinary skill can still 
  
 4 See Application of Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 5 The enablement requirement comes from 35 U.S.C. § 112 which requires the patent 
specification to describe “the manner and process of making and using [the invention], in 
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to 
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the 
[invention].” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
 6 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 7 Known as one of eight Wands factual inquiries in determining the level of 
experimentation: (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of 
direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the 
nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the 
art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims. 
See id. 
 8 See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Genentech Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 
MacMillan v. Moffett, 432 F.2d 1237, 1240 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“In some unpredictable 
areas of chemistry and biology, there is no conception until the invention has been 
reduced to practice.”). 
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use general knowledge to implement the claimed invention with reasonable 
expectation of success.9 
Predictability of a particular art depends heavily on whether the existing 
knowledge base of one of ordinary skill in the art can be used to reliably achieve 
potentially patentable new results.10 As such, it has been observed that 
predictable arts include mechanical and electrical inventions, while 
unpredictable arts include chemical and physiological inventions.11 Software is a 
technical discipline typically recognized as a predictable art due to its close 
association to electrical engineering, which generally requires very little to 
satisfy the written description requirement.12 Regardless of its associated 
technological discipline, an invention directed towards novel configurations and 
arrangement of pre-existing technology infers a finding that the invention is 
directed towards the predictable arts.13 
II. THE KSR DECISION CREATES A BIAS AGAINST PREDICTABLE ARTS 
Issued patents are presumed to be valid, and challenges to patent validity 
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence,14 even for prior art references 
that were not examined by the USPTO during prosecution.15 The burden of 
  
 9 See AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(“[T]he artisan’s knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill 
gaps, interpolate between embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the 
disclosed embodiments, depending upon the predictability of the art.”). 
 10 See Rothman v. Target Corp., 556 F.3d 1310, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“In the 
predictable arts, a trial record may more readily show a motivation to combine known 
elements to yield a predictable result.”). 
 11 Application of Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 12 Greg R. Vetter, The Predictability Doctrine and the Software Arts, 76 MO. L. REV. 
763, 804–06 (2011) (arguing that software should not necessarily be considered as a 
predictable art despite conventional wisdom to the contrary because most software runs 
on a series of layers where vulnerability in each layer can lead to unpredictability); see 
also In re Hayes Microcomputer Prod. Patent Litig., 982 F.2d 1527, 1533–36 (Fed. Cir. 
1992). 
 13 See Ex Parte Huppenthal, No. 2009-010115, 2011 WL 1826813, at *3–4 (B.P.A.I. 
May 10, 2011) (affirming examiner finding of obviousness, noting that invention 
claiming cluster computer system covering a configuration of known components to be a 
predictable art). 
 14 The “‘clear and convincing’ standard is an intermediate standard which lies 
somewhere in between the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ and the ‘preponderance of the 
evidence’ standards of proof. Although an exact definition is elusive, ‘clear and 
convincing evidence’ has been described as evidence that ‘place[s] in the ultimate 
factfinder an abiding conviction that the truth of its factual contentions are highly 
probable.’” See Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1359 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(citation omitted). 
 15 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 132 S. Ct. 2238, 2252 (2011). 
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proof rests with the patent challenger.16 With respect to obviousness, the clear 
and convincing evidentiary standard is not satisfied by a mere showing that all 
of the claimed elements exist in the prior art.17 At a minimum, establishing 
obviousness under the clear and convincing evidentiary standard requires 
showing some likelihood of success in combining the prior art to meet the claim 
elements.18 
On appeal, obviousness is a question of law receiving de novo review.19 It 
is important to note that “rejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained 
by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated 
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of 
obviousness.”20 As discussed in detail below, however, litigated patents in the 
predictable arts face an increased likelihood of obviousness invalidation in the 
post-KSR landscape. 
KSR involved an infringement action over a patent directed to connecting 
an electronic throttle control to adjustable vehicle control pedals.21 Applying the 
obviousness factors articulated in Graham v. John Deere, the district court ruled 
on summary judgment that the relevant asserted patent claim was invalid due to 
obviousness, finding that there was little difference between the claim at issue 
and the prior art.22 The district court further stated that the Federal Circuit’s 
“teaching, suggestion, and motivation” (TSM) test was met because the claimed 
structure would have inevitably been derived in the industry based on teachings 
in the prior art.23 The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the district court 
failed to apply the TSM test strictly enough.24 The Federal Circuit criticized the 
  
 16 “A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether in independent, 
dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the 
validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid 
even though dependent upon an invalid claim. The burden of establishing invalidity of a 
patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.” 35 U.S.C. 
§ 282 (2012). 
 17 See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 655 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). 
 18 See Celsis In Vitro, Inc. v. Cellzdirect, Inc., 664 F.3d 922, 928–29 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 19 See Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg Inc., 705 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 20 In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 21 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 399 (2007). 
 22 Id. at 399–401 (finding that Graham v. John Deere set forth an “expansive and 
flexible approach to the obviousness question”). Graham sets forth the main factual 
inquiries to determine obviousness: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) 
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and (3) the 
level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17 
(1966). Other factual factors may be relevant in determining, known as secondary 
considerations, include commercial success, long felt need, and failure of others. Id. 
 23 KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S at 399–400. 
 24 Id. 
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inferences made based on the prior art because none of the references were 
directed to the precise problem that the invention sought to address.25 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the Federal Circuit 
addressed the obviousness question in a narrow and rigid manner that is 
inconsistent with both 35 U.S.C. § 103 and the Graham decision.26 One of the 
main takeaways from KSR is that, although the TSM test can provide a “helpful 
insight” regarding obviousness, the Federal Circuit improperly adopted this 
“helpful insight” as a “rigid and mandatory formula.”27 Though the Supreme 
Court noted that there is no “necessary inconsistency” between the TSM test and 
Graham, it cautioned that an overly rigid adherence to the TSM test may lead to 
situations where common sense combinations of prior art are ignored:28 
The diversity of inventive pursuits and of modern technology counsels 
against limiting the analysis in this way. In many fields it may be that there 
is little discussion of obvious techniques or combinations, and it often may 
be the case that market demand, rather than scientific literature, will drive 
design trends. Granting patent protection to advances that would occur in 
the ordinary course without real innovation retards progress and may, in 
the case of patents combining previously known elements, deprive prior 
inventions of their value or utility.29 
The KSR decision eliminated the rigid application of the TSM test to 
show obviousness, and also made the Graham factors less restrictive. Under the 
traditional Graham analysis, a prior art reference cannot be considered in the 
obviousness analysis unless it can first be classified as an analogous art. Prior to 
KSR, the Federal Circuit followed a two-step analysis to determine whether a 
prior art reference is analogous: “(1) whether the art is from the same field of 
endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not 
within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the reference still is 
reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is 
involved.”30 
The Supreme Court adopted a less restrictive approach, holding that all 
prior art can be considered for obviousness purposes as long as it addresses “any 
need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and 
addressed by the patent.”31 The Supreme Court disapproved of the assumption 
that a person of ordinary skill attempting to solve a problem will be led only to 
  
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 418. 
 28 Id. at 401. 
 29 Id. at 419 (emphasis added). 
 30 See, e.g., In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658–59 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing In re Deminski, 
96 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986)); In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 
Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 31 KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 420. 
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those elements of prior art designed to solve the same problem, noting that 
“familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes.”32 
Once the threshold question of the scope of the relevant prior art has been 
determined, Graham requires the fact finder to consider whether the subject 
matter of a claim is obvious by analyzing the “objective reach of the claim.”33 A 
guiding principle in this analysis requires courts to distinguish between “real 
innovation” versus “advances . . . in the ordinary course.”34 In detailing a non-
exhaustive list of rationales on which a conclusion of obviousness can be based, 
KSR heavily invoked the concepts of predictability and common sense. For 
instance, a rigid application of TSM analysis should not restrain a finding of 
obviousness when “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known 
methods . . . does no more than yield predictable results.”35 Likewise, an overly 
narrow application of the TSM test should not preclude a finding of obviousness 
when a claimed improvement was merely “the predictable use of prior art 
elements according to their functions.”36 
III. THE USPTO GUIDELINES INTERPRETING KSR FURTHER CEMENTS 
THE BIAS AGAINST PREDICTABLE ARTS 
Approximately five months after the KSR decision, on October 10, 2007, 
the USPTO issued interim guidelines in response to the decision instructing 
examiners how to evaluate whether and how one of ordinary skill in the art 
would exercise ordinary creativity, common sense, and logic to determine 
obviousness.37 The 2007 KSR Guidelines listed seven, non-mutually exclusive 
rationales discussed within the KSR decision that patent examiners may use to 
demonstrate obviousness.38 Readily-apparent is the fact that virtually all the 
inquiries involve whether the elements were already “known” and whether the 
art is predictable: 
  
 32 Id. at 420; see Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1237–38 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(finding prior art relating to sealing of padlocks to prevent contamination to be pertinent 
to asserted patents directed to sealing of trailer hitch locks for automobiles); see also In 
re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1380–82 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding patent 
claim directed to gas spring as means for retaining folding mechanism on treadmill as 
obvious). 
 33 KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 420. 
 34 Id. at 402. 
 35 Id. at 401; U.S. v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 50–52 (1966). 
 36 KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 401. 
 37 See Examination Guidelines for Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. 103 in 
View of the Supreme Court Decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 72 Fed. 
Reg. 57,526-01, 57,526–35 (Oct. 10, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 KSR Guidelines]. 
 38 Id. at 57,529. 
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 Combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield 
predictable results 
 Simple substitution according to known methods to yield 
predictable results 
 Use of known techniques to improve similar devices (methods, or 
products) in the similar way 
 Applying a known technique to a known device (method, or 
product) ready for improvement to yield predictable results 
 "Obvious to Try" from a finite number of identified, predictable 
solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success 
 Known work in one field of endeavor may prompt variations of it 
for use in either the same field or a different one based on design 
incentives or other market forces if the variations would have been 
predictable to one of ordinary skill in the art 
 TSM test: Some teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art 
that would have led one of ordinary skill to modify the prior art 
reference or to combine prior art reference teachings to arrive at 
the claimed invention39 
The 2007 KSR Guidelines also provided the factual elements necessary to 
prove each of the seven rationales and utilized various pre-KSR Federal Circuit 
cases as examples. In lockstep with the KSR decision, the 2007 KSR Guidelines 
advised patent examiners to retreat from any structured approach to determine 
obviousness and support a flexible framework where the focus of the inquiry is 
on the predictability of prior art combinations or the application of known 
components or techniques.40 
Approximately three years later, the USPTO issued an updated guideline 
on September 1, 2010 to provide additional guidance based on an analysis of 
Federal Circuit jurisprudence on obviousness after KSR. The 2010 KSR 
Guidelines reaffirmed that “KSR did not place any limit on the particular 
approach to be taken to formulate the line of reasoning [and that] the KSR 
decision is not to be seen as replacing a single test for obviousness—e.g., the 
TSM test—with the seven rationales listed in the 2007 KSR Guidelines.”41 In 
addition, the 2010 KSR Guidelines further re-affirmed that although patent 
practitioners needed to shift the emphasis of nonobviousness arguments to a 
certain degree, the familiar lines of nonobviousness argument still apply, 
  
 39 Id. (emphasis added). 
 40 Id. at 57,534. 
 41 Examination Guidelines Update: Developments in the Obviousness Inquiry After 
KSR v. Teleflex, 75 Fed. Reg. 53,643-01, 53,645 (Sept. 1, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 KSR 
Guidelines]. 
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including “teaching away from the claimed invention by the prior art, lack of a 
reasonable expectation of success, and unexpected results.”42 
These lines of argument, especially with respect to reasonable expectation 
of success and unexpected results, are influenced by the relative predictability of 
the art. The predictability of the technology affects the scope and content of the 
knowledge base for one of ordinary skill in the art. In unpredictable fields where 
pertinent references to a proposed claim invention are sparse, it may be more 
difficult to identify prior art that teaches away from the claimed invention. 
Moreover, it is often difficult to discern the advantages and innovation of 
predictable art inventions, making it easier for a potential patent infringer to 
present sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case of obviousness during 
prosecution. This has the effect of placing a heavier burden on the patentee, 
where the patentee must be prepared to demonstrate nonobviousness, “such as 
comparative test data showing that the claimed invention possesses improved 
properties not expected by the prior art,” in order to overcome likely 
obviousness rejections from the USPTO.43 
Whereas the 2007 KSR Guidelines provided explanations and case 
examples with respect to seven types of obviousness reasoning, the 2010 KSR 
Guidelines focused on Federal Circuit obviousness cases involving three 
rationales: combining prior art elements, substitution of known methods with 
another, and obvious to try.44 
The “combining prior art elements” case examples discussed by the 
USPTO in the 2010 KSR Guidelines demonstrate that the greater the complexity 
of the art, the easier it is to argue that the combination of known elements of 
  
 42 Id. 
 43 See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2142 (9th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 
2012). It is important to note that in the patent litigation context, there is no shifting of 
“the burden of proof to the patentee to rebut the asserted, but improper, prima facie case 
with the evidence of commercial success and copying. This is a distortion of the burden 
of proof, which never leaves the challenger.” Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams 
USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride 
Extended–Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court has never imposed nor even contemplated a formal burden-shifting 
framework in the patent litigation context.”). 
 44 The 2010 KSR Guidelines also discussed consideration of evidence, noting that all 
timely presented evidence, including evidence rebutting a prima facie case of 
obviousness, must be considered in an obviousness analysis; evidence of commercial 
success is pertinent where a nexus between the success of the product and the claimed 
invention has been demonstrated; and that evidence of secondary consideration may not 
overcome a strong prima facie case of obviousness. See, e.g., 2010 KSR Guidelines, 
supra note 41, at 53,658–59; PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Sullivan, 498 F.3d 1345, 1351–53 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Hearing 
Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc., 600 F.3d 1357, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Asyst Techs., 
Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc., 544 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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prior art “teaches away” from the claimed invention. For example, the claimed 
technology in In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation involved coatings on a pill 
formulation.45 The Federal Circuit found that one of ordinary skill would not 
have predictably arrived at the claimed modification from the prior art process 
due to the “multiple paths” available to address the problem.46 Indeed, the 
benefits of the claimed modification over the known and successful prior 
formulation were not recognized at the time of patenting.47 
Likewise, with respect to a medical device patent directed to screws used 
in spinal surgery, the Federal Circuit preserved validity in finding that the 
presented prior art combination expressly taught away from the claimed 
configuration.48 By contrast, obviousness-based “combining known elements” is 
more likely to be found in the predictable technical fields, such as mechanical 
covers, trailer locks, or methods of applying pesticide.49 
The case examples discussing obviousness by “substituting one known 
element for another” in the 2010 KSR Guidelines illustrate only examples of 
obviousness for predictable art inventions such as inventions directed to folding 
and stabilizing the base of a treadmill,50 utilizing a resistive electrical switch in a 
stationary pest control device,51 and internet auction systems for municipal 
bonds.52 
The 2010 KSR Guidelines also discuss cases involving “obvious to try,” 
perhaps the most controversial expansion in the obviousness analytical 
framework.53 In this particular analysis, the context of the subject matter must be 
  
 45 In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 536 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 46 Id. at 1380–81. 
 47 Id. 
 48 DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). 
 49 See, e.g., Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1366–68 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding asserted patent claims directed to segmented and mechanical 
covers to be obvious); Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335, 1349–50 (Fed Cir. 
2009) (finding method of sanitizing meat by spraying it with an antibacterial spray under 
conditions, including “at least 50 psi,” to be obvious); Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 
F.3d 1231, 1237–38 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding patent covering hitch pin locks for trailers 
to be obvious); Cf. Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1308–11 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (finding patent covering footwear nonobvious because prior art expressly taught 
away from claimed feature of having foam straps riveted to a foam base). 
 50 In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1380–82 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 51 Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., 520 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 52 Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 53 The Supreme Court in KSR identifies the elements of “obvious to try.” KSR Int’l 
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 402–03 (2007) (“When there is a design need or 
market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable 
solutions, a person of ordinary skill in the art has good reason to pursue the known 
options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is 
likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.”). 
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considered, meaning that the “characteristics of the science of technology [and] 
its state of advance” are an explicit part of the analysis.54 The “obvious to try” 
analysis, as with the other lines of obviousness reasoning discussed in the 2010 
KSR Guidelines, hinges largely on whether one of ordinary skill in the art would 
be able to predictably combine or modify the prior art references to arrive at the 
claimed invention. This is exemplified with respect to the requirement that there 
only be a “finite number” of predictable solutions in the art.55 
As interpreted by the Federal Circuit, “finite” means a small or easily 
negotiable number, such as a claimed drug formulation that can be discovered 
by experimenting with one of two known techniques in the prior art.56 For 
example, in the pharmaceutical industry, a claimed isolated nucleic acid 
molecule was found to be obvious when prior art identified “conventional 
methods” by which the claimed molecule can be isolated.57 If the facts 
demonstrate that there are only a “finite number” of predictable solutions in the 
art, nonobviousness can be demonstrated if there is no reasonable expectation of 
success in combining or modifying the prior art references.58 Again, it is more 
likely that a claimed invention is “obvious to try” for technologies in 
traditionally predictable fields of art, because a claimed combination is obvious 
to try when it makes common sense to do so.59 As noted by KSR, common sense 
obviousness manifests when there are “finite number of identified, predictable 
solutions”60 
  
 54 See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming 
district court’s granting of preliminary injunction on extended release formulations of an 
antibiotic). 
 55 See Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs, Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (holding anti-convulsion drug nonobvious because it was unexpectedly discovered 
during research for new anti-diabetic drug). 
 56 Id.; Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Barr Labs., Inc., 575 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (finding patent relating to drug coating for increasing bioavailability to be obvious 
because the prior art was not vague in pointing toward a general approach or area of 
exploration, but rather guided the formulator precisely to the use of one of two methods). 
 57 In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 58 Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007); Ortho-McNeil, 520 F.3d at 1364; see also Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 
550 F.3d 1075, 1087–89 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding patent relating to drug used to treat or 
prevent blood-thrombotic events, such as heart attacks and strokes, not obvious due to 
unpredictability and experimentation involved); Rolls-Royce, PLC v. United Techs. 
Corp., 603 F.3d 1325, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding patent relating to swept fan 
blades used on turbofan jet engines nonobvious due the broad selection of choices for 
further investigation in the art, and the lack of motivation in prior art to create the 
claimed design). 
 59 Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1328–29 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 60 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007). 
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Thus, the USPTO’s post-KSR guidelines further confirm the existence of 
a bias against the predictable arts. 
IV. CURRENT BIAS AGAINST THE PREDICTABLE ARTS IN PATENT 
OBVIOUSNESS FRAMEWORK 
The expansion of the obviousness doctrine to include “common sense” 
combinations of prior art shifts the focus of an obviousness analysis from what 
is disclosed in the prior art to the level of predictability in the art and the level of 
knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art. Although the USPTO guidelines 
have emphasized that evaluations of invalidity should always be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis, there are indicators in patent jurisprudence to strongly 
suggest that there is a bias against patents in the predictable art fields. For one, 
the predictability of the art has entrenched many of the secondary considerations 
of nonobviousness. Second, the Federal Circuit’s lead compound analysis is an 
example of the rigid analysis needed to analyze obviousness in unpredictable 
arts. Finally, Federal Circuit decisions after issuance of the post-KSR guideline 
confirm the existence of this bias. 
A. The Objective Indicia of Secondary Considerations Incorporates Analysis of 
Technology Predictability 
Secondary considerations are court-recognized contextual considerations 
used to assist judges in determining obviousness with the most prominent 
categories being commercial success, long felt need, failure of others, and 
copying by others.61 Created to serve as “objective indicia” of whether an 
invention should be afforded a patent, secondary considerations are based upon 
“economic and motivational” reasons, divorced from the technology claimed in 
the patent at issue.62 
A study of cases after KSR shows that secondary considerations, rarely, if 
ever, override a prima facie showing of obviousness.63 Indeed, there is criticism 
that the doctrine of secondary considerations is substantially underdeveloped.64 
In addition, it has been suggested that the KSR decision implicitly downplays the 
role of secondary analysis by holding that where “the content of the prior art, the 
  
 61 See Perfect Web, 587 F.3d at 1328–29 (for a discussion of other secondary 
consideration analyzed by courts); Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
 62 Graham, 383 U.S. at 36. 
 63 See, e.g., Natalie A. Thomas, Secondary Considerations in Nonobviousness 
Analysis: The Use of Objective Indicia Following KSR v. Teleflex, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
2070, 2077 (2011); Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical 
Demonstration that Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1391, 1404 (2006). 
 64 Jonathan J. Darrow, Secondary Considerations: A Structured Framework for 
Patent Analysis, 74 ALB. L. REV. 47, 50 (2010). 
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scope of the patent claim, and the level of ordinary skill in the art are not in 
material dispute, and the obviousness of the claim is apparent in light of these 
factors, summary judgment is appropriate.”65 
Further, issues regarding predictability and technological complexity 
invariably become a part of the discussion in a secondary analysis. Proof of 
secondary considerations of nonobviousness must demonstrate a nexus between 
the objective indicia and the patented invention.66 For example, with respect to 
the indicia of commercial success, the patentee is required to show a “legally 
and factually sufficient connection” between proven success and the patented 
invention to establish the requisite nexus.67 
This standard is applied to require the patentee to demonstrate that the 
inventive features of the patent are the reason for the commercial success.68 On 
the other hand, if the commercial success is “due to an element in the prior art, 
no nexus exists.”69 Moreover, to the extent that the commercial success and the 
patented invention are not co-extensive, the patentee must demonstrate a 
relationship between the patent and the commercial product sufficient to support 
an inference of nexus.70 Even if an inference of nexus has been established, it 
can be rebutted by showing that the commercial success is due to non-technical 
factors, such as advertising, business acumen, capital resources, or superior 
workmanship.71 
The secondary indicia of long-felt need requires a technical discussion, as 
the technical merits of the invention at issue must represent a solution to the 
problem identified in the prior art.72 In addition, a failure of others analysis 
requires a technological discussion, as relevant factors include the 
acknowledgement of a need in the art, and that artisans were attempting to find a 
  
 65 KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 426; Eli M. Sheets, Arguing Secondary Considerations 
After KSR: Proceed with Caution, 21 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 1, 14–15 (2011). 
 66 See, e.g., In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Wyers v. Master Lock 
Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enter., Inc., 632 F.3d 
1358, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 67 Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 
1988); Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 68 In re Kao, 639 F.3d at 1069–70. 
 69 See Tokai, 632 F.3d at 1369–70. 
 70 Demaco, 851 F.2d at 1392. 
 71 J.T. Eaton & Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
 72 See Demaco, 851 F.2d at 1392–93; Hughes Tool Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 
816 F.2d 1549, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
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solution to the art over a long duration of time.73 Similarly, relying on copying 
by others to show nonobviousness requires a showing that competitors are 
specifically copying the patented features to give rise to an inference of a 
nexus.74 
When it comes to patents in the predictable arts, the patentee faces a 
higher burden in establishing the nexus for commercial success. Since most 
technical elements will be already known in a predictable art, the patentee may 
find it difficult to identify the inventive elements that link the commercial 
success to the proposed invention. Hypothetically, even if an invention proposes 
a new configuration of previously known prior art elements not readily 
discoverable by one of ordinary skill in the art, there may still be insufficient 
factual basis for commercial success because the reason for said success is “due 
to an element in the prior art.”75 Even if competitors in the industry copied the 
patented product, in fields of predictable art, it will be difficult to prove that 
competitors actually copied the inventive aspects of the invention, as opposed to 
merely copying marketing methods or workmanship quality. By contrast, it will 
be far easier to prove a nexus between commercial success and a new 
pharmaceutical product that serves as a more effective treatment for a particular 
illness. The fact that the new product is more effective than already existing 
medications serves as a strong inference of such a nexus. 
As is the case with proving the nexus to commercial success, proving the 
other secondary indicia in predictable art patents is similarly difficult. Fields of 
predictable art, such as simple mechanical devices, are far less likely to generate 
scholarly articles articulating a particular need in the industry, as opposed to 
unpredictable fields such as biochemistry. Furthermore, fields of predictable arts 
are less likely to generate breakthrough technologies that impact the 
marketplace. These technological breakthroughs occur more frequently in 
unpredictable arts such as biochemistry and physiology, where long-thought 
incompatible reactions and combinations of compounds ultimately prove to be 
useful. On the other hand, publications on more predictable fields, such as 
software, slant more heavily towards using the broad base of known 
technologies and techniques. In this environment, it will be more difficult to 
discern specific declarations of long-felt need from those of ordinary skill in the 
relevant industry. As such, despite the fact that secondary considerations are 
meant to be non-technical in nature, demonstrating nonobviousness through 
secondary considerations in the predictable arts is not an easy task, since 
  
 73 B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp., 72 F.3d 1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (“only a brief time period” found unpersuasive); Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 946 F.2d 821, 835 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & 
Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Advanced Display 
Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 74 Cable Elec. Prods, Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 75 See Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters., Inc., 632 F.3d 1358, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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proving the relevant objective indicia requires well-developed discussion 
regarding the technical merits. 
B. The Federal Circuit’s “Lead Compound” Analysis of Chemical Compounds 
Exemplifies a Bias Against Predictable Arts 
The “lead compound” cases further demonstrate the technological 
sophistication in an obviousness analysis.76 The “lead compound” cases involve 
a two-factor test for determining the obviousness of a claimed compound: that 
one of ordinary skill in the art (1) would have selected a certain chemical 
compound as a lead compound; and (2) would have had motivation to modify 
the lead compound to arrive at the claimed compound.77 This stringent and 
intensive analysis is meant to specifically help the courts determine obviousness 
in the unpredictable field of biological compounds. The relatively rigorous 
application of this test by the courts raises the burden of proving obviousness for 
an unpredictable art beyond the KSR baseline. This serves as yet another 
instance of bias against predictable arts. 
On its face, the categorical application of this two-factor test for chemical 
compounds appears to be the type of “rigid” analysis, akin to the TSM test, that 
KSR frowned upon.78 Yet, it has persevered and thrived post-KSR. The 2010 
KSR Guidelines note that the lead compound cases “form an important 
subgroup of the obviousness cases that are based on substitution.”79 This, 
however, left unanswered the question of whether it is proper to follow the “lead 
compound” analysis per se in determining the patentability of chemical 
compounds. In response, the Federal Circuit has indicated that the flexibility in 
determining the “lead compound” factors is consistent with the KSR principles, 
though they failed to reconcile the categorical application of an obviousness rule 
to the principles of KSR.80 
  
 76 See Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1343 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (“At the heart of this validity dispute is whether one of skill in this art 
would have found motivation to combine pieces from one compound in a prior art patent 
with a piece of another compound in the second prior art patent through a series of 
manipulations.”); see also In re Lalu, 747 F.2d 703, 707 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 77 See Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1354 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 78 Other problems with the lead compound analysis include district court confusion 
over the application of this test, and the failure to factor in the realities of drug 
development, such as patents covering combination drugs and formulations. See Briana 
Barron, Structural Uncertainty: Understanding the Federal Circuit’s Lead Compound 
Analysis, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 401, 417–20 (2012). 
 79 2010 KSR Guidelines, supra note 41, at 53,651. 
 80 Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs. Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1357–59 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“[P]ost-KSR, a prima facie case of obviousness for a chemical compound still, in 
general, begins with the reasoned identification of a lead compound.”). 
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The heart of the matter is that the flexibility inherent within the lead 
compound analysis gives patentees more leeway to argue nonobviousness of 
their invention. For example, any known compound can serve as a lead 
compound as long as there is some motivation by one of ordinary skill in the art 
to select that compound.81 But demonstrating a suitable lead compound is no 
easy task, and instead presents an additional element in the nonobviousness 
analysis that must be determined. The 2010 KSR Guidelines instruct that 
examiners can select compounds that “pharmaceutical chemists would not select 
as lead compounds due to expense, handling issues, or other business 
considerations.”82 Nevertheless, the examiner must still present adequate reasons 
to justify the selection of a particular lead compound. 
It is difficult to reconcile the difference between how pharmaceutical 
chemists and one of ordinary skill in the art would select a lead compound. In 
addition, the Federal Circuit has said that the selection of a lead compound 
should be guided by the compound’s pertinent properties as assessed by one of 
ordinary skill in the art, such as activity, potency, toxicity, and other chemical 
properties.83 
Assuming that a suitable lead compound even exists, then there must be 
motivation to modify the chemical compound, but such motivation need not be 
explicitly found in the prior art, and more than one compound may be selected 
as a lead compound.84 However, the mere structural similarity between the 
claimed compounds and any other prior art lead compound is insufficient 
motivation.85 Instead, the patent challenger must demonstrate “a sufficiently 
close relationship” to create an expectation that the claimed compound will have 
“similar properties” to the prior art compound.86 Moreover, even if there is a 
motivation to select and modify the claimed compound, obviousness can be 
found only if there is a “reasonable expectation of success” that modifying the 
prior art lead compound will yield the claimed compound.87 Accordingly, 
sorting through this myriad of technological issues gives the patentee plenty of 
latitude to make nonobviousness arguments. The lead compound analysis 
appears to be in stark contradiction to the Supreme Court’s disapproval of the 
rigid application of rules to determine obviousness. By comparison, the same 
  
 81 Id. at 1359. 
 82 2010 KSR Guidelines, supra note 41, at 53,652. 
 83 Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 84 Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(“The requisite motivation [to modify] can come from any number of sources and need 
not necessarily be explicit in the art.”); Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 85 Eisai Co., 533 F.3d at 1357. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 996–97 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). 
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elevated burden of proof to show obviousness is not afforded to patentees in 
predictable fields of art, demonstrating a tangible bias against predictable arts. 
C. Recent Federal Circuit Decisions Further Demonstrate the Bias in the 
Analysis of Obviousness Against Patents in the Predictable Arts 
As discussed earlier, prime examples of unpredictable arts usually involve 
biochemistry and physiology, such as pharmaceuticals compounds for human 
use. Pharmaceutical compound patents are more likely to be nonobvious due to 
extensive amounts of research and development involved in their discovery. 
This research will have probative value in demonstrating that the claimed 
invention is more than the “common sense” combination of known elements. 
For example, In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended–Release Capsule 
Patent Litigation involved patents covering a modified-release dosage form of 
skeletal muscle relaxants and a method of relieving muscle spasms with the said 
formulation.88 The technical field involved pharmacokinetics, the study of how a 
person reacts to medication after administration.89 The inventors conducted 
experiments to ascertain the correct pharmacokinetic/pharmacodynamic 
(PK/PD) profile for the extended release of cyclobenzaprine hydrochloride.90 
The prior art did not disclose PK/PD values, and the district court premised a 
finding of obviousness based on bioequivalence of PK values upon immediate 
release of the compound.91 
The Federal Circuit disagreed and noted that without known PK/PD 
relationship, immediate-release PK values were of little use in calculating 
extended-release values, because there was no proof that a skilled artisan would 
expect the extended release values to produce a therapeutic effect solely because 
they are drawn from immediate-release values.92 The patent expressly disclosed 
the PK/PD data generated by experimentation.93 Here, due to the 
unpredictability of measuring the physiological effectiveness of medication, 
there was tangible research that was disclosed in the patent that the prior art 
failed to disclose. 
The unpredictability of the technological field at issue is also likely to 
lead to the availability of evidence that the prior art teaches away from the 
claimed invention. In Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, 
Inc., the patent-in-suit involved intervertebral implants that have an upper side 
and lower side each containing a “single anchor” to affix the implant into the 
  
 88 In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended–Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 
F.3d 1063, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 89 Id. at 1067. 
 90 Id. at 1071. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 1073. 
 93 Id. 
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vertebrae.94 The parties agreed that a prior art reference from a common inventor 
disclosed all of the elements of the only independent claim asserted but for the 
“single anchor” element.95 The Federal Circuit also found that the “single 
anchor” design was present in the prior art.96 Nevertheless, although the prior art 
references met all of the elements of the claimed invention, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the jury’s finding of nonobviousness because the record showed that 
single anchors were previously thought to be unsafe and unsuitable for use in 
implants.97 
Whether a field of art is predictable may not always be superficially 
apparent,98 as illustrated in Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.99 
There, the patent was directed towards a specific method to cure tobacco leaves 
to prevent TSNA, a known carcinogen, from forming.100 The court observed that 
although methods of curing tobacco have long been known, the patent-in-suit 
observed that tobacco-curing procedures required a careful controlling of 
conditions such as humidity, temperature, airflow, and carbon dioxide levels that 
is “more of an art than a science,” interjecting unpredictability into the field of 
art.101 The patented method claimed a very specific set of curing conditions and 
procedures that substantially prevented TSNA from forming.102 Because the two 
main prior art references presented failed to make the key observation that 
TSNAs may be prevented in an aerobic curing condition, which is the condition 
specifically claimed by the asserted patent to prevent TSNAs from forming, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of nonobviousness.103 
As indicated above, the unpredictability of the “lead compound” sub-class 
of cases makes it easier to show nonobviousness, especially in regard to proving 
that one of ordinary skill would be able to modify the prior art to obtain the 
claimed compound. For example, the Federal Circuit affirmed summary 
judgment of nonobviousness in Unigene Laboratories, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 
  
 94 Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305, 
1311–12 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 95 Id. at 1311. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 1312. 
 98 For instance, in a recent reexamination appeal, the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences considered the opinion of a retained expert to help decide whether the 
design of golf balls is a predictable art in determining issues of obviousness. See 
Acushnet Co. Requester v. Patents of Callaway Golf Co. Patent Owner, Nos. 2010-
012258, 2011-001247, 2011-001248, 2011-001255, 2011 WL 841207, at *4–6 (B.P.A.I. 
Mar. 9, 2011). 
 99 Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 655 F.3d 1364, 1375–76 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 1368. 
 102 Id. at 1369. 
 103 Id. at 1376. 
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where the asserted claim at issue involved specific formulations for nasal 
sprays.104 The claim at issue involved the use of citric acid as an absorption and 
stabilizing agent in lieu of the prior art agent BZK that does not contain citric 
acid.105 This, in combination with the fact that the prior art references discussed 
minimalized the role of citric acid as an absorption/stabilizing agent, led the 
Federal Circuit to conclude that the asserted patent claim was nonobvious.106 
Even though all of the elements of the claimed compound were known in the 
prior art, the analytical framework still required a suggestion to modify the prior 
art to obtain the claimed compound. 
Indeed, one of the challenges of proving obviousness in “lead compound” 
cases is the selection of the lead compound itself. In Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. 
Matrix Laboratories, Ltd., the patent-in-suit covered angiotensin receptor 
blockers (ARBs) used in the treatment of high blood pressure.107 The Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of the selection of the prior art 
ARB as a lead compound based solely on the structural similarity of the claimed 
compound, explaining that selecting “a compound as a lead compound depends 
on more than just structural similarity, but also knowledge in the art of the 
functional properties and limitations of the prior art compounds.”108 The Federal 
Circuit additionally affirmed the finding that the prior art teaches away from the 
claimed compound, indicating that the prior art expressed a preference for 
lipophilic groups at a certain point in the compound, whereas the claimed 
compound used hydrophilic substitutes instead.109 Given the unpredictability in 
the field, the mere structural resemblance alone is an insufficient reason for a 
compound to be selected as a lead compound.110 
The difficulty in selecting a suitable lead compound is further examined 
in Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., which involved a patent for 
the antipsychotic compound aripiprazole, the active ingredient in the brand 
name drug Abilify.111 In Otsuka, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
rejection of the defendants’ three proposed compounds as lead compounds due 
to the fact that the proposed compounds lacked sufficient potency, were of an 
overbroad genus of compounds, and exhibited far too toxic effects for one of 
ordinary skill to select any of the proposed compounds as a starting point.112 The 
  
 104 Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1362–64 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 105 Id. at 1363. 
 106 Id. at 1364. 
 107 Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Matrix Labs., Ltd., 619 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
 108 Id. at 1354; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1377–
79 (Fed.Cir.2006). 
 109 Daiichi Sankyo Co., 619 F.3d at 1354–55. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 112 Id. at 1293–96. 
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Otsuka case demonstrates that the negative effects or characteristics associated 
with a compound can weigh against its selection as a lead compound.113 
One distinction impacting obviousness may be whether the claims are 
directed towards a compound versus the application or efficacy of a compound. 
The creation of a new compound is likely to be deemed unpredictable whereas 
an invention claiming the dosage of a known compound for improved efficacy is 
likely to be deemed predictable.114 For example, a recent case found a patent 
claim covering the administration of a chemotherapy cancer drug in a solution to 
be obvious.115 Regarding patents relating to dosage of drug compounds already 
known, the Federal Circuit noted that “where there is a range disclosed in the 
prior art, and the claimed invention falls within that range, there is a 
presumption of obviousness.”116 For instance, in Tyco Healthcare Group LP v. 
Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., the patented formulation for a sleep-inducing 
drug fell within the range of prior art, and there was no record that the patented 
formulation had a particular impact on the efficacy of the drug.117 As such, the 
district court’s finding of obviousness was affirmed.118 Likewise, a patent on a 
chewing gum formulation with improved cooling effects was found to be 
obvious when the elements of the formulations were known, and the 
combination did not achieve an unexpected cooling effect.119 
Demonstrating nonobviousness is a far more difficult task in the 
predictable arts, as it typically requires an explicit showing that the prior art 
references teach away from the claimed combination.120 In the predictable arts, 
there is a far greater likelihood that most of the claimed elements are already 
well-known, and that the art is characterized by marginal and incremental 
  
 113 See Barron, supra note 78, at 410. 
 114 See Frederick G. Vogt, Unexpected Results: The Current Status of Obviousness 
Determinations for Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Patents, 29 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & 
ENVTL. L. 305, 325 (2010) (discussing the unpredictability of polymorphic compounds—
the different crystalline states of the same drug molecule that may have different 
properties). 
 115 Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 116 Tyco Healthcare Group LP v. Mutual Pharm. Co., Inc., 642 F.3d 1370, 1372–73 
(Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1331–32 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (invalidating asserted claims to methods and apparatuses for generating a 
particular pulse sequence for recording information to a rewritable optical disc for 
obviousness because the desired range for rotation of apparatus overlaps with prior art). 
 117 Tyco Healthcare, 642 F.3d at 1376. 
 118 Id. at 1377. 
 119 Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1363–64 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
 120 See In re Suong-Hyu Hyon, 679 F.3d 1363, 1468–72 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (affirming 
method for making ultra high molecular weight polyethylene block for artificial joints to 
be obvious). 
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improvements.121 In addition, in cases where “the technology is easily 
understandable,” expert testimony is not required,122 further reducing the overall 
burden of proof in demonstrating obviousness for predictable arts. 
For instance, in Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., the patented 
inventions relate to the relatively predictable art of machines that make stainless 
steel stents cut into a lace-like pattern to permit expansion and retention after 
insertion into the artery.123 Specifically, the claimed machines affixed laser 
cutters in a way that embraced the machine vibrations, as opposed to prior art 
methods that attempted to suppress or deaden the vibrations.124 Here, the Federal 
Circuit found sufficient facts on record that the prior art taught away from the 
claimed invention, but noted that there was some level of flexibility in applying 
the concept of teaching away because it did “not require that the prior art 
fores[ee] the specific invention that was later made, and warned against taking 
that path.”125 Instead, to demonstrate that the references teach away, there must 
be sufficient facts showing that prior art methods contradict the claimed 
invention so that a reasonable jury could conclude nonobviousness.126 
In Media Technologies Licensing, LLC v. Upper Deck Co., the patent-in-
suit was titled “Memorabilia Card” and was directed towards attaching a small 
portion of authentic sports memorabilia to a related article (i.e., baseball trading 
card).127 The Federal Circuit found that the characteristics of trading cards were 
predicable in both content and presentation.128 As such, the only question with 
respect to obviousness is whether it would have been obvious to one skilled in 
the art to attach a sports-related item to a trading card, as opposed to other types 
of authentic memorabilia items shown in the prior art.129 Despite a well-reasoned 
  
 121 See FED TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 2, at 25–26 (2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-
balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC 
REPORT] (“[T]echnology developed in industries such as semiconductors, computer 
hardware, and software can contain a large number of incremental innovations.”). 
 122 Meyer Intellectual Props. Ltd. v. Bodum, Inc., 690 F.3d 1354, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 
2010); Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Centricut, LLC 
v. Esab Group, Inc., 390 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 123 Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 1344. 
 127 Media Techs. Licensing, LLC v. Upper Deck Co., 596 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
 128 Id. at 1338. 
 129 Id. 
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policy dissent from Judge Rader, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
finding of obviousness.130 
Another predictable technological field that relies heavily on well-known 
elements is in the mechanical arts. In In re Construction Equipment Co., the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the USPTO’s finding of obviousness for a patent 
directed to a vehicle for screening rocks and plant matter based on or from an 
area of soil or dirt.131 In that case, the court concluded that the alleged invention, 
while possibly new, was nevertheless obvious because it consisted entirely of 
known elements combined into a machine.132 There, the record showed that the 
basic concepts of sifting and sorting through materials, carrying materials via 
conveyors, and positing the machine for use were not new.133 
Similarly, in Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enterprises, Inc., claims of the 
asserted patents directed to utility lighters with automatic child safety 
mechanisms for preventing accidental ignition were affirmed to be obvious.134 
The Federal Circuit noted that the prior art taught all of the claimed elements, 
and that there was no unpredictability in combining the elements, particularly in 
light of the fact that one of ordinary skill in the art was defined as “an individual 
showing aptitude in high school shop class, or someone who builds, takes apart, 
or repairs basic mechanical toys/devices.”135 
Internet transaction patents are also typically considered to be predictable 
as they frequently claim “routine modifications” to the prior art. This is 
especially true with respect to the commonplace application of “computer and 
internet technology to replace older electronics.”136 In Western Union Co. v. 
MoneyGram Payment Systems, Inc., the invention was a method for performing 
“formless” money transfer transactions using an electronic transaction 
fulfillment device (EFTD) over the Internet.137 The prior art system implemented 
a fax machine over a phone line to conduct the same transaction.138 Dismissing 
the fact that the patentee spent considerable resources towards the commercial 
embodiment of the EFTD system as unrelated to any “inventive aspects 
  
 130 Judge Rader criticized the lack of rigor in weighing the evidence and applying the 
obviousness standards, asking rhetorically, “[i]s this an indication that this court views 
this field of art and this invention as unworthy of the full processes of the law?” Id. at 
1342. 
 131 In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d 1254, 1254–55 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id.; see also Cimline, Inc. v. Crafco, Inc., 413 Fed. Appx. 240, 245–46 (Fed. Cir. 
Mar. 2, 2011) (invalidating patent disclosing a sealant melter having a manual, gravity 
powered conveyor and a splash guard box as being obvious). 
 134 Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters., Inc., 632 F.3d 1358, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 135 Id. at 1369–71. 
 136 W. Union Co. v. MoneyGram Payment Sys., Inc., 626 F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
 137 Id. at 1366. 
 138 Id. at 1370. 
 
186 Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property [Vol. 13 
 
 
 
claimed,” the Federal Circuit held the substitution of fax machines over phone 
lines to EFTDs over the Internet to be predictable.139 
More recently, Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg Inc. employed similar 
reasoning to the Western Union case.140 In Soverain, the patents-in-suit were 
directed towards an online commerce system where a merchant’s product could 
be offered and purchased.141 During trial, the district court removed the question 
of obviousness from the jury based on insufficiency of testimony.142 The Federal 
Circuit reversed and found the patents-in-suit to be obvious upon de novo 
review.143 Specifically, the Federal Circuit analyzed three separate sets of claims 
at issue and found each set to be obvious in view of a prior art system labeled as 
“CompuServe Mall.”144 The Federal Circuit based its analysis primarily on the 
fact that all of the claimed elements were generally well-known in the prior 
art.145 Moreover, even though the claimed system may have had superior 
features and the CompuServe Mall was created for pre-Internet systems, one of 
ordinary skill would have been able to readily adapt the available prior art to 
render the asserted claims obvious.146 Moreover, the Federal Circuit noted that 
plaintiff, Soverain, failed to establish a nexus between the commercial software 
and the patents-in-suit.147 
Telecommunications is a related, but separate, technological field 
characterized by incremental improvements.148 For example, in In re Katz 
Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, the asserted patents covered 
telephone systems and interfaces for transactions, call routing, and handling of 
both digital and voice signals from callers.149 Here, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment for obviousness, finding that the 
proposed prior art combinations covered the claimed elements and that there 
was no unpredictability for one of ordinary skill to combine the elements.150 As 
the cases above illustrate, whether a patent is likely to be found invalid due to 
obviousness can be heavily inferred from whether the field of art can be 
characterized as predicable. In the post-KSR “common-sense” obviousness 
  
 139 Id. 
 140 See Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg Inc., 705 F.3d 1333, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 1336. 
 143 Id. at 1336–37. 
 144 Id. at 1338–46. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 1346–47. 
 148 Computer hardware and integrated circuits provide the foundation for the 
telecommunications industry. See FTC REPORT, supra note 121, ch. 3, at 30. 
 149 See In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1308–09 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 150 Id. at 1322–23. 
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landscape, the patentee faces significant difficulties in rebutting a prima facie 
presentation of obviousness in fields of predictable arts.151 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR BALANCING AGAINST THE BIAS 
Although obviousness remains a bedrock eligibility requirement to 
patents in the United States, the task of sifting through complicated issues of fact 
and law for obviousness may have become too overbearing for some. Recently, 
those alleged of patent infringement have been increasingly resorting to utility 
arguments under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as a basis to attack patentability.152 Many have 
observed that this trend is an attempt to avoid engaging in an obviousness 
analysis altogether.153 In comparison to the myriad of factors and considerations 
in an obviousness argument, the utility invalidity argument requires the validity 
challenger to demonstrate that the invention lacks any “specific, substantial, and 
credible” use.154 The vagueness of the utility invalidity argument allows the 
USPTO to project standards of what qualifies as a “useful” art, an approach 
criticized by Judge Rader precisely “because it lacks any standard for assessing 
the state of the prior art and the contributions of the claimed advance.”155 This 
trend further reflects a growing discontent with the legal framework of 
obviousness. 
The frustration regarding the inconsistent application of the obviousness 
standard is palpable. For example, Judge Dyk of the Federal Circuit noted in an 
infringement action involving patents directed towards the frothing of milk for 
coffee beverages that “one cannot help but conclude that this case is an example 
  
 151 See Michael R. Dzwonczyk, Implementing a “Predictable” Obviousness Standard 
Post-KSR 5, 8 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.sughrue.com 
/files/Publication/c184ddaf-8489-4b7c-84a9-061409df7037/Presentation/PublicationAtta 
chment/35de691e-b34e-4e83-9ce6-092161dca7d8/Implementingapredictable.pdf (“[I]n 
the first four months following KSR, affirmances [of final office action rejections] in 
technology center 1600 (biotechnology) rose to almost 80%. . . . [A]ffirmances in 
technology center 3700 (mechanical engineering) rose from less than 50% to over 60% in 
the same time period.”). 
 152 Imran Khaliq, Expect More Rulings Invalidating Patents Under Section 101, 
LAW360 (Nov. 25, 2013, 1:13 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/488905/expect-
more-rulings-invalidating-patents-under-section-101. 
 153 See Benjamin H. Graf, Prognosis Indeterminable: How Patent Non-Obviousness 
outcomes Depend Too Much on Decision-Makers, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 
567, 590–91 (2011). 
 154 The substantial utility requirement requires showing that the claimed invention has 
a “significant and presently available benefit to the public.” In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Under the specific utility requirement, an application must 
“disclose a use which is not so vague as to be meaningless.” Id. Both substantial and 
specific utility must be considered credible by a person of ordinary skill in the art. See 
Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-02, 1098 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
 155 In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1382. 
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of what is wrong with our patent system.”156 Specifically, Judge Dyk provided 
additional strong language criticizing the application of the current obviousness 
framework: 
[Under KSR], it would be reasonable to expect that the claims would have 
been rejected as obvious by the examiner, and, if not, that they would have 
been found obvious on summary judgment by the district court. But no 
such thing. The parties have spent hundreds of thousands of dollars and 
several years litigating this issue, and are invited by us to have another go 
of it in a second trial. Such wasteful litigation does not serve the interests 
of the inventorship community, nor does it fulfill the purposes of the 
patent system.157 
However, the courts should not be so rash in dismissing inventions on the 
sole basis of art predictability alone. In the dissenting opinion of the Media 
Technologies case, Judge Rader expressly cautioned against the discrimination 
against patents in the predictable arts, stating that courts “cannot overlook that 
many individuals invest vast energies, efforts, and earnings to advance these 
nontechnical fields of human endeavor,” and that the “incentives for 
improvement and the protection of invention apply as well to the creator of a 
new hair-extension design as to a researcher pursuing a cure for cancer.”158 
The question then becomes what should the courts do to counterbalance 
the bias against predictable art patents in the current obviousness analytical 
framework. There are two potential solutions: (1) strengthen the secondary 
consideration analysis, and (2) revitalize the prohibition against the use of 
hindsight bias in an obviousness analysis. The revitalization of the prohibition 
against the use of hindsight is crucial since KSR disavowed the rigorous 
application of the TSM test.159 The TSM test was noted to be the best defense 
against the use of hindsight bias.160 
D. Strengthening of Secondary Considerations 
As mentioned earlier, one of the consequences of the KSR decision is the 
diminished role of secondary considerations in obviousness considerations.161 
This diminished role is reflected in Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. v. Fisher Price, 
Inc., where the Federal Circuit held that “substantial evidence” of commercial 
success, praise in the industry, and long-felt need were insufficient to overcome 
  
 156 See Meyer Intellectual Props. Ltd. v. Bodum, Inc., 690 F.3d 1354, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (Dyk, J., concurring). 
 157 Id. at 1380. 
 158 See Media Techs. Licensing, LLC v. Upper Deck Co., 596 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 159 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 402–03 (2007). 
 160 In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 161 See supra Part IV.A. 
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the strength of a prima facie finding of obviousness (though the Leapfrog case is 
ambiguous regarding whether “substantial evidence” of secondary consideration 
will always be insufficient to overcome a prima facie finding of obviousness).162 
As a corrective measure, a rigorous analysis of the secondary consideration 
factors should be permitted to overcome a “common sense” prima facie case of 
obviousness.163 Given the relative ease that KSR allows one to establish a prima 
facie showing of obviousness, an equitable counterbalance would be to 
presumptively give more weight to the secondary consideration elements. 
To further revitalize the secondary considerations, there should be a less 
stringent standard for evaluating the nexus between the factual indicia and the 
claimed invention. For example, with respect to commercial success, as long as 
there is evidence that a commercial embodiment of an invention is actually 
being successfully sold, an inference of nonobviousness should be given if it is 
more likely than not that the inventive features caused the commercial success. 
Similarly, allowing the patentee to prove the secondary factors with 
circumstantial evidence, or through a totality of the circumstances approach, 
may otherwise help preserve validity of a patent in the predictable arts. For 
example, strong sales of a product with patented features in combination with 
copying by others in the industry should be strong indicators that the patent is 
nonobvious. Moreover, proof of significant expenditure in the research and 
development leading to the claimed invention should also be probative evidence 
in favor of nonobviousness. 
The Federal Circuit or the USPTO may also help raise the relevance of 
secondary considerations by issuing a comprehensive framework for secondary 
considerations, something that the Federal Circuit has so far declined to take 
on.164 Having a more workable and well-defined framework may improve the 
form and substance of secondary consideration arguments presented before 
judges. Recognizing the need to preserve the incentive to innovate in the 
predictable arts, Congress may also pass legislation to ensure that patents in all 
fields are entitled to equal protection. 
E. Prohibit the Use of Hindsight 
Another way to balance the obviousness inquiry is to revitalize the 
prohibition against the use of hindsight. Generally, this prohibition is based on 
the observation that obviousness “cannot be based on the hindsight combination 
of components selectively culled from the prior art to fit the parameters of the 
  
 162 See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1161–62 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
 163 Id.; See Amanda Wieker, Secondary Considerations Should Be Given Increased 
Weight in Obviousness Inquiries Under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in the Post-KSR v. Teleflex 
World, 17 FED. CIR. B.J., 665, 680 (2008). 
 164 See Darrow, supra note 64, at 53–54. 
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patented invention.”165 Similar to the application of the secondary 
considerations, there has been no consistent framework of applying the 
hindsight bias prohibition. The KSR decision preserved the prohibition against 
the use of hindsight bias but gave little guidance with respect to how to identify 
the bias: “the distortion caused by hindsight bias” and the need to “be cautious 
of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning,” and at the same time rejecting the 
need for a teaching, suggestion, or motivation as an absolute prerequisite for 
finding the obviousness of a given combination of prior art elements.166 
Indeed, the improper use of hindsight appears precisely to be the concern 
obviated by a rigorous application of the TSM test.167 Prior to KSR, the Federal 
Circuit found that “[t]he best defense against the subtle but powerful attraction 
of hindsight-based obviousness analysis is rigorous application of the 
requirement for a showing of the teaching or motivation to combine prior art 
references.”168 In the post-KSR landscape, a set of more predictable guidelines 
for analyzing hindsight bias in an obviousness analysis could provide much 
needed clarity for practitioners, and also strike a balance against the expansive 
scope of KSR.169 Without further guidance, the hindsight bias consideration runs 
the risk of either becoming a complete afterthought in an obviousness inquiry or 
a purely subjective determination by a judge or patent examiner. 
Finally, post-KSR, courts should exercise more caution to ensure that their 
exercise of a “common sense” approach to obviousness invalidity is based on 
the state of the art at the time of patenting. This awareness should be heightened 
in the predictable arts, a field dominated by common knowledge and 
incremental improvements. To avoid falling into the hindsight bias trap, courts 
should recognize the need to preserve the incentive to innovate in the predictable 
arts and not overlook innovative combinations or configurations of known 
technologies and methods. Ironically, perhaps a cursory application of the TSM 
test as performed by the district court in the KSR decision can prevent against 
improper applications of hindsight. 
CONCLUSION 
The current state of the patent obviousness inquiry poses a significant 
bias against patents in the predictable arts. The doctrines of secondary 
consideration and hindsight bias have been significantly weakened by the KSR 
  
 165 See ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 546 (Fed.Cir.1998). 
 166 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421–23 (2007). 
 167 Joseph Scott Miller, Remixing Obviousness, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 237, 240–
44 (2008). 
 168 See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 169 The hindsight bias analysis has been criticized as “irrational” based upon empirical 
research of experimental scenarios, concluding that “once individuals are aware of an 
outcome, they are cognitively unable to discount or ignore that knowledge; they no 
longer view prior events objectively.” See Mandel, supra note 63, at 1403. 
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decision and have long been criticized as esoteric and unpredictable. The current 
state of the obviousness analysis in awarding patents in the predictable arts has 
the potential to deprive inventors of incentives to innovate in certain 
technological fields altogether. Indeed, many technical arts can be characterized 
as predictable because of the heavy utilization of pre-existing and predictable 
techniques and technologies. From a policy viewpoint, revitalization measures 
should be taken to ensure that the broad lines of reasoning for obviousness in 
KSR do not become an insurmountable bottleneck against those who innovate in 
predictable technologies. 
Legislative and/or judicial measures should be taken to set more 
definitive and uniform guidelines on how obviousness is to be evaluated 
(regardless of the predictability of the art) to provide more certainty to 
innovators and patent practitioners. These measures should be carefully crafted 
to give equal consideration to the value and potential of the claimed inventions, 
regardless of technological complexity. 
